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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3691 
 ___________ 
 
 ALVIN S. KANOFSKY, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States Tax Court 
 (Tax Court No. 08-24784) 
 Trial Judge:  Honorable David Laro 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 21, 2011 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. AND COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 21, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant, pro se, appeals an order of the United States Tax Court sustaining a 
proposed levy as a means of collecting Appellant’s delinquent federal income tax 
liability.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
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I. 
In December 2007, the United States Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) sent 
Appellant Alvin Kanofsky a notice of intent to levy in an effort to collect his federal 
income tax delinquencies for the years 1996 through 2000.1  Kanofsky requested a 
collection due process (“CDP”) hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals regarding the 
proposed collection action.2
The Settlement Officer assigned to his case requested from Kanofsky in writing 
that he provide the officer with certain documents necessary to proceed with the CDP 
hearing.  Kanofsky’s response did not provide these documents, nor did it address any 
  His stated reason for disagreeing with the proposed levy was 
that the Tax Court decision regarding these underlying tax liabilities was currently on 
appeal in this Court.  Kanofsky did not file a bond with the Tax Court before his appeal, 
or at any time thereafter.   
                                                 
1 Kanofsky’s federal income tax liability was previously decided by the Tax Court 
and affirmed by this Court.  Kanofsky v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1045 (2006), aff’d, 
No. 07-1860, 2008 WL 857567 (3d Cir. Apr. 1, 2008).  The Supreme Court subsequently 
denied Kanofsky’s petition for certiorari, 540 U.S. 823 (Dec. 8, 2008), as well as his later 
petition for rehearing, 129 S. Ct. 1406 (Feb. 23, 2009).   
2 CDP hearings are informal proceedings that provide a delinquent taxpayer with an 
opportunity to be heard before the IRS can levy upon his or her property in order to 
satisfy outstanding tax liabilities.  See generally 26 U.S.C. § 6330.  CDP hearings need 
not be conducted face-to-face and may instead consist of a telephonic conference or 
correspondence with a Settlement Officer.  Living Care Alternatives of Utica v. United 
States, 411 F.3d 621, 624 (6th Cir. 2005).  During the hearing, the taxpayer is permitted 
to propose collection alternatives such as a settlement or payment schedule, and the 
Settlement Officer ultimately must determine whether the proposed levy “balances the 
need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the person that 
any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary.”  26 U.S.C § 6330(c)(3).  The 
Settlement Officer’s decision generally is reviewable by the Tax Court for abuse of 
discretion.  See Kindred v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2006).  On appeal, the 
taxpayer may only raise issues raised during the CDP hearing.   
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matters pertinent to the collection of his tax liability or collection alternatives.  On 
September 8, 2008, the IRS Office of Appeals issued a Notice of Determination 
approving the proposed levy.  In the notice, the Office of Appeals advised Kanofsky that 
the proposed levy was sustained because he did not present any issues that could be 
addressed in a CDP action.   
Kanofsky timely challenged that determination.  A trial was held before the Tax 
Court, and Kanofsky appeared as the sole witness.  Kanofsky attempted to raise claims 
that he had been prevented from pursuing his business activities due to fraud and 
corruption and a “crime wave” in Philadelphia.  Trial Tr. 15 (Oct. 21, 2009).  Kanofsky 
also attempted to admit as evidence a large folder of documents consisting of docket 
sheets from criminal cases, newspaper clippings, corporate records, financial information, 
and other materials.  The Tax Court sustained the IRS’s objection to admitting this 
evidence and testimony on the ground that it was not relevant.  Further, the court found 
these arguments to be an impermissible attempt by Kanofsky to relitigate his underlying 
tax liability.  When asked what basis he had for asserting an abuse of discretion, 
Kanofsky testified that he felt that the Third Circuit should have waited for his appeal to 
be resolved before imposing the levy, and that the IRS “could have been more 
cooperative in seeking some sort of accommodation.”  Trial Tr. at 28.   
Following the trial, the Tax Court entered a decision sustaining the determination 
made by the Office of Appeals.  Kanofsky filed a motion to vacate that decision, based on 
what he described as “overwhelming evidence of Fraud and Corruption.”  On June 4, 
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2010, the Tax Court denied the motion.  Kanofsky now appeals.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).  We have plenary review 
over the Tax Court’s conclusions of law, but we will not disturb its factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous.   Lattera v. Comm’r, 437 F.3d 399, 401 (3d Cir. 2006); 
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 2000).  Where, as here, the 
underlying tax liability is not in issue, the determination of the IRS Office of Appeals in a 
collection due process hearing is reviewed by both the Tax Court and the Court of 
Appeals for abuse of discretion.  See Kindred v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 
2006); Living Care Alternatives of Utica v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 
2005).   
III. 
 We find that the Tax Court correctly held that the Office of Appeals acted within 
its discretion in permitting the propsed levy to proceed.  Kanofsky did not pay the 
balance due, and the IRS properly issued a notice of intent to levy to collect the unpaid 
liabilities.  During the CDP hearings, Kanofsky failed to propose any collection 
alternatives or provide the Settlement Officer with the required supporting financial 
information.  Kanofsky was not entitled to relitigate his tax liability during the CDP 
hearing, since that issue had been determined by the Tax Court, in a decision affirmed by 
this Court.  Kanofsky v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1045 (2006), aff’d, No. 07-1860, 
2008 WL 857567 (3d Cir. Apr. 1, 2008).  Moreover, Kanofsky was not entitled to a stay 
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of assessment or collection activity pending his appeal because he had not filed a bond 
with the Tax Court, as specifically required by § 7485 of the Code.3
Kanofsky’s basis for his appeal includes arguments based on obstruction of 
justice, corruption and fraud committed by public figures in Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey.  He also appears to argue that in imposing his tax liability, consideration should 
have been given to his extensive whistleblower activity in the University of Medicine and 
Dentistry of New Jersey health fraud case.  These arguments are not relevant to the 
imposition of a levy in Kanofsky’s case and do not advance his cause.  Kanofsky also 
appears to raise challenges to the underlying merits of his tax liability.  These arguments 
have been previously litigated and are beyond the scope of our review.  Kanofsky 
presents no viable argument that the Tax Court erred in finding that the Office of Appeals 
did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the levy. 
  See Burke v. 
Comm’r, 124 T.C. 189, 191 n.4 (2005) (“Petitioner did not file an appeal bond, [under §] 
7485, and, therefore, respondent was free to proceed with assessment and collection for 
the years in issue”).   
Accordingly, we will affirm.      
 
                                                 
3 As a general rule, where a taxpayer has challenged a Notice of Deficiency by filing a 
petition in the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 6213 prohibits the IRS from assessing the tax 
liability or attempting to collect it by means of a levy until the Tax Court’s decision has 
become final.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a).  However, pursuant to § 7485, assessment and 
collection shall not be stayed during an appeal from Tax Court unless a taxpayer files a 
bond on or before the time he files a notice of appeal.  See 26 U.S.C. § 7485(a)(1). 
